Visible to the public Biblio

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Corneci, Vlad-Mihai, Carabas, Costin, Deaconescu, Razvan, Tapus, Nicolae.  2019.  Adding Custom Sandbox Profiles to iOS Apps. 2019 18th RoEduNet Conference: Networking in Education and Research (RoEduNet). :1–5.
The massive adoption of mobile devices by both individuals and companies is raising many security concerns. The fact that such devices are handling sensitive data makes them a target for attackers. Many attack prevention mechanisms are deployed with a last line of defense that focuses on the containment principle. Currently, iOS treats each 3rd party application alike which may lead to security flaws. We propose a framework in which each application has a custom sandboxed environment. We investigated the current confinement architecture used by Apple and built a solution on top of it.
Marin, M\u ad\u alina Angelica, Carabas, Costin, Deaconescu, R\u azvan, T\u apus, Nicolae.  2019.  Proactive Secure Coding for iOS Applications. 2019 18th RoEduNet Conference: Networking in Education and Research (RoEduNet). :1–5.

In this paper we propose a solution to support iOS developers in creating better applications, to use static analysis to investigate source code and detect secure coding issues while simultaneously pointing out good practices and/or secure APIs they should use.

Deshotels, Luke, Deaconescu, Razvan, Carabas, Costin, Manda, Iulia, Enck, William, Chiroiu, Mihai, Li, Ninghui, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza.  2018.  iOracle: Automated Evaluation of Access Control Policies in iOS. Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :117-131.

Modern operating systems, such as iOS, use multiple access control policies to define an overall protection system. However, the complexity of these policies and their interactions can hide policy flaws that compromise the security of the protection system. We propose iOracle, a framework that logically models the iOS protection system such that queries can be made to automatically detect policy flaws. iOracle models policies and runtime context extracted from iOS firmware images, developer resources, and jailbroken devices, and iOracle significantly reduces the complexity of queries by modeling policy semantics. We evaluate iOracle by using it to successfully triage executables likely to have policy flaws and comparing our results to the executables exploited in four recent jailbreaks. When applied to iOS 10, iOracle identifies previously unknown policy flaws that allow attackers to modify or bypass access control policies. For compromised system processes, consequences of these policy flaws include sandbox escapes (with respect to read/write file access) and changing the ownership of arbitrary files. By automating the evaluation of iOS access control policies, iOracle provides a practical approach to hardening iOS security by identifying policy flaws before they are exploited.