Visible to the public Biblio

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Jacobs, Nicholas, Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina, Vugrin, Eric.  2018.  Measurement and Analysis of Cyber Resilience for Control Systems: An Illustrative Example. 2018 Resilience Week (RWS). :38—46.

Control systems for critical infrastructure are becoming increasingly interconnected while cyber threats against critical infrastructure are becoming more sophisticated and difficult to defend against. Historically, cyber security has emphasized building defenses to prevent loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability in digital information and systems, but in recent years cyber attacks have demonstrated that no system is impenetrable and that control system operation may be detrimentally impacted. Cyber resilience has emerged as a complementary priority that seeks to ensure that digital systems can maintain essential performance levels, even while capabilities are degraded by a cyber attack. This paper examines how cyber security and cyber resilience may be measured and quantified in a control system environment. Load Frequency Control is used as an illustrative example to demonstrate how cyber attacks may be represented within mathematical models of control systems, to demonstrate how these events may be quantitatively measured in terms of cyber security or cyber resilience, and the differences and similarities between the two mindsets. These results demonstrate how various metrics are applied, the extent of their usability, and how it is important to analyze cyber-physical systems in a comprehensive manner that accounts for all the various parts of the system.

Huang, Hao, Kazerooni, Maryam, Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina, Etigowni, Sriharsha, Zonouz, Saman, Davis, Katherine.  2019.  Fast Generation Redispatch Techniques for Automated Remedial Action Schemes. 2019 20th International Conference on Intelligent System Application to Power Systems (ISAP). :1–8.
To ensure power system operational security, it not only requires security incident detection, but also automated intrusion response and recovery mechanisms to tolerate failures and maintain the system's functionalities. In this paper, we present a design procedure for remedial action schemes (RAS) that improves the power systems resiliency against accidental failures or malicious endeavors such as cyber attacks. A resilience-oriented optimal power flow is proposed, which optimizes the system security instead of the generation cost. To improve its speed for online application, a fast greedy algorithm is presented to narrow the search space. The proposed techniques are computationally efficient and are suitable for online RAS applications in large-scale power systems. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods, there are two case studies with IEEE 24-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems.