# Biblio

Starting with the seminal work by Kempe et al., a broad variety of problems, such as targeted marketing and the spread of viruses and malware, have been modeled as selecting

a subset of nodes to maximize diffusion through a network. In

cyber-security applications, however, a key consideration largely ignored in this literature is stealth. In particular, an attacker often has a specific target in mind, but succeeds only if the target is reached (e.g., by malware) before the malicious payload is detected and corresponding countermeasures deployed. The dual side of this problem is deployment of a limited number of monitoring units, such as cyber-forensics specialists, so as to limit the likelihood of such targeted and stealthy diffusion processes reaching their intended targets. We investigate the problem of optimal monitoring of targeted stealthy diffusion processes, and show that a number of natural variants of this problem are NP-hard to approximate. On the positive side, we show that if stealthy diffusion starts from randomly selected nodes, the defender’s objective is submodular, and a fast greedy algorithm has provable approximation guarantees. In addition, we present approximation algorithms for the setting in which an attacker optimally responds to the placement of monitoring nodes by adaptively selecting the starting nodes for the diffusion process. Our experimental results show that the proposed algorithms are highly effective and scalable.

Attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) which manipulate sensor readings can cause enormous physical damage if undetected. Detection of attacks on sensors is crucial to mitigate this issue. We study supervised regression as a means to detect anomalous sensor readings, where each sensor's measurement is predicted as a function of other sensors. We show that several common learning approaches in this context are still vulnerable to \emph{stealthy attacks}, which carefully modify readings of compromised sensors to cause desired damage while remaining undetected. Next, we model the interaction between the CPS defender and attacker as a Stackelberg game in which the defender chooses detection thresholds, while the attacker deploys a stealthy attack in response. We present a heuristic algorithm for finding an approximately optimal threshold for the defender in this game, and show that it increases system resilience to attacks without significantly increasing the false alarm rate.

This paper focuses on the optimal sensor placement problem for the identification of pipe failure locations in large-scale urban water systems. The problem involves selecting the minimum number of sensors such that every pipe failure can be uniquely localized. This problem can be viewed as a minimum test cover (MTC) problem, which is NP-hard. We consider two approaches to obtain approximate solutions to this problem. In the first approach, we transform the MTC problem to a minimum set cover (MSC) problem and use the greedy algorithm that exploits the submodularity property of the MSC problem to compute the solution to the MTC problem. In the second approach, we develop a new \textit{augmented greedy} algorithm for solving the MTC problem. This approach does not require the transformation of the MTC to MSC. Our augmented greedy algorithm provides in a significant computational improvement while guaranteeing the same approximation ratio as the first approach. We propose several metrics to evaluate the performance of the sensor placement designs. Finally, we present detailed computational experiments for a number of real water distribution networks.