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Li, Jun, Zhang, Wei, Chen, Xuehong, Yang, Shuaifeng, Zhang, Xueying, Zhou, Hao, Li, Yun.  2021.  A Novel Incentive Mechanism Based on Repeated Game in Fog Computing. 2021 3rd International Conference on Advances in Computer Technology, Information Science and Communication (CTISC). :112–119.

Fog computing is a new computing paradigm that utilizes numerous mutually cooperating terminal devices or network edge devices to provide computing, storage, and communication services. Fog computing extends cloud computing services to the edge of the network, making up for the deficiencies of cloud computing in terms of location awareness, mobility support and latency. However, fog nodes are not active enough to perform tasks, and fog nodes recruited by cloud service providers cannot provide stable and continuous resources, which limits the development of fog computing. In the process of cloud service providers using the resources in the fog nodes to provide services to users, the cloud service providers and fog nodes are selfish and committed to maximizing their own payoffs. This situation makes it easy for the fog node to work negatively during the execution of the task. Limited by the low quality of resource provided by fog nodes, the payoff of cloud service providers has been severely affected. In response to this problem, an appropriate incentive mechanism needs to be established in the fog computing environment to solve the core problems faced by both cloud service providers and fog nodes in maximizing their respective utility, in order to achieve the incentive effect. Therefore, this paper proposes an incentive model based on repeated game, and designs a trigger strategy with credible threats, and obtains the conditions for incentive consistency. Under this condition, the fog node will be forced by the deterrence of the trigger strategy to voluntarily choose the strategy of actively executing the task, so as to avoid the loss of subsequent rewards when it is found to perform the task passively. Then, using evolutionary game theory to analyze the stability of the trigger strategy, it proves the dynamic validity of the incentive consistency condition.

Bi, Ting, Chen, Xuehong, Li, Jun, Yang, Shuaifeng.  2020.  Research on Industrial Data Desensitization Algorithm Based on Fuzzy Set. 2020 IEEE International Conference on Advances in Electrical Engineering and Computer Applications( AEECA). :1–5.
With the rapid development of internet technology, informatization and digitalization have penetrated into every link of human social life. A large amount of sensitive data has been accumulated and is still being generated within the enterprise. These sensitive data runs through the daily operation of enterprises and is widely used in business analysis, development and testing, and even some outsourcing business scenarios, which are increasing the possibility of sensitive data leakage and tampering. In fact, due to the improper use of data and the lack of protective measures and other reasons, data leakage events have happened again and again. Therefore, by introducing the concept of fuzzy set and using the membership function method, this paper proposes a desensitization technology framework for industrial data and a data desensitization algorithm based on fuzzy set, and verifies the desensitization effect and protective action on sensitive data of this algorithm through the test data desensitization experiment.