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Colnago, Jessica, Devlin, Summer, Oates, Maggie, Swoopes, Chelse, Bauer, Lujo, Cranor, Lorrie, Christin, Nicolas.  2018.  "It's Not Actually That Horrible'': Exploring Adoption of Two-Factor Authentication at a University. Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. :456:1-456:11.

Despite the additional protection it affords, two-factor authentication (2FA) adoption reportedly remains low. To better understand 2FA adoption and its barriers, we observed the deployment of a 2FA system at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). We explore user behaviors and opinions around adoption, surrounding a mandatory adoption deadline. Our results show that (a) 2FA adopters found it annoying, but fairly easy to use, and believed it made their accounts more secure; (b) experience with CMU Duo often led to positive perceptions, sometimes translating into 2FA adoption for other accounts; and, (c) the differences between users required to adopt 2FA and those who adopted voluntarily are smaller than expected. We also explore the relationship between different usage patterns and perceived usability, and identify user misconceptions, insecure practices, and design issues. We conclude with recommendations for large-scale 2FA deployments to maximize adoption, focusing on implementation design, use of adoption mandates, and strategic messaging.

Ur, Blase, Alfieri, Felicia, Aung, Maung, Bauer, Lujo, Christin, Nicolas, Colnago, Jessica, Cranor, Lorrie Faith, Dixon, Henry, Emami Naeini, Pardis, Habib, Hana et al..  2017.  Design and Evaluation of a Data-Driven Password Meter. Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. :3775–3786.
Despite their ubiquity, many password meters provide inaccurate strength estimates. Furthermore, they do not explain to users what is wrong with their password or how to improve it. We describe the development and evaluation of a data-driven password meter that provides accurate strength measurement and actionable, detailed feedback to users. This meter combines neural networks and numerous carefully combined heuristics to score passwords and generate data-driven text feedback about the user's password. We describe the meter's iterative development and final design. We detail the security and usability impact of the meter's design dimensions, examined through a 4,509-participant online study. Under the more common password-composition policy we tested, we found that the data-driven meter with detailed feedback led users to create more secure, and no less memorable, passwords than a meter with only a bar as a strength indicator.
Sharif, Mahmood, Bhagavatula, Sruti, Bauer, Lujo, Reiter, Michael K..  2016.  Accessorize to a Crime: Real and Stealthy Attacks on State-of-the-Art Face Recognition. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :1528–1540.

Machine learning is enabling a myriad innovations, including new algorithms for cancer diagnosis and self-driving cars. The broad use of machine learning makes it important to understand the extent to which machine-learning algorithms are subject to attack, particularly when used in applications where physical security or safety is at risk. In this paper, we focus on facial biometric systems, which are widely used in surveillance and access control. We define and investigate a novel class of attacks: attacks that are physically realizable and inconspicuous, and allow an attacker to evade recognition or impersonate another individual. We develop a systematic method to automatically generate such attacks, which are realized through printing a pair of eyeglass frames. When worn by the attacker whose image is supplied to a state-of-the-art face-recognition algorithm, the eyeglasses allow her to evade being recognized or to impersonate another individual. Our investigation focuses on white-box face-recognition systems, but we also demonstrate how similar techniques can be used in black-box scenarios, as well as to avoid face detection.

Mazurek, Michelle L., Komanduri, Saranga, Vidas, Timothy, Bauer, Lujo, Christin, Nicolas, Cranor, Lorrie Faith, Kelley, Patrick Gage, Shay, Richard, Ur, Blase.  2013.  Measuring Password Guessability for an Entire University. Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer &\#38; Communications Security. :173–186.
Despite considerable research on passwords, empirical studies of password strength have been limited by lack of access to plaintext passwords, small data sets, and password sets specifically collected for a research study or from low-value accounts. Properties of passwords used for high-value accounts thus remain poorly understood. We fill this gap by studying the single-sign-on passwords used by over 25,000 faculty, staff, and students at a research university with a complex password policy. Key aspects of our contributions rest on our (indirect) access to plaintext passwords. We describe our data collection methodology, particularly the many precautions we took to minimize risks to users. We then analyze how guessable the collected passwords would be during an offline attack by subjecting them to a state-of-the-art password cracking algorithm. We discover significant correlations between a number of demographic and behavioral factors and password strength. For example, we find that users associated with the computer science school make passwords more than 1.5 times as strong as those of users associated with the business school. while users associated with computer science make strong ones. In addition, we find that stronger passwords are correlated with a higher rate of errors entering them. We also compare the guessability and other characteristics of the passwords we analyzed to sets previously collected in controlled experiments or leaked from low-value accounts. We find more consistent similarities between the university passwords and passwords collected for research studies under similar composition policies than we do between the university passwords and subsets of passwords leaked from low-value accounts that happen to comply with the same policies.