Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Qu, G.  [Clear All Filters]
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
H
Liu, B., Jin, Y., Qu, G..  2015.  Hardware Design and Verification Techniques for Supply Chain Risk Mitigation. 2015 14th International Conference on Computer-Aided Design and Computer Graphics (CAD/Graphics). :238–239.

We present a brief survey on the state-of-the-art design and verification techniques: IC obfuscation, watermarking, fingerprinting, metering, concurrent checking and verification, for mitigating supply chain security risks such as IC misusing, counterfeiting and overbuilding.

M
Zhang, J., Ji, X., Xu, W., Chen, Y.-C., Tang, Y., Qu, G..  2020.  MagView: A Distributed Magnetic Covert Channel via Video Encoding and Decoding. IEEE INFOCOM 2020 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. :357—366.

Air-gapped networks achieve security by using the physical isolation to keep the computers and network from the Internet. However, magnetic covert channels based on CPU utilization have been proposed to help secret data to escape the Faraday-cage and the air-gap. Despite the success of such cover channels, they suffer from the high risk of being detected by the transmitter computer and the challenge of installing malware into such a computer. In this paper, we propose MagView, a distributed magnetic cover channel, where sensitive information is embedded in other data such as video and can be transmitted over the air-gapped internal network. When any computer uses the data such as playing the video, the sensitive information will leak through the magnetic covert channel. The "separation" of information embedding and leaking, combined with the fact that the covert channel can be created on any computer, overcomes these limitations. We demonstrate that CPU utilization for video decoding can be effectively controlled by changing the video frame type and reducing the quantization parameter without video quality degradation. We prototype MagView and achieve up to 8.9 bps throughput with BER as low as 0.0057. Experiments under different environment are conducted to show the robustness of MagView. Limitations and possible countermeasures are also discussed.

N
Gao, M., Qu, G..  2017.  A novel approximate computing based security primitive for the Internet of Things. 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS). :1–4.

The Internet of Things (IoT) has become ubiquitous in our daily life as billions of devices are connected through the Internet infrastructure. However, the rapid increase of IoT devices brings many non-traditional challenges for system design and implementation. In this paper, we focus on the hardware security vulnerabilities and ultra-low power design requirement of IoT devices. We briefly survey the existing design methods to address these issues. Then we propose an approximate computing based information hiding approach that provides security with low power. We demonstrate that this security primitive can be applied for security applications such as digital watermarking, fingerprinting, device authentication, and lightweight encryption.

S
Chen, X., Qu, G., Cui, A., Dunbar, C..  2017.  Scan chain based IP fingerprint and identification. 2017 18th International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED). :264–270.

Digital fingerprinting refers to as method that can assign each copy of an intellectual property (IP) a distinct fingerprint. It was introduced for the purpose of protecting legal and honest IP users. The unique fingerprint can be used to identify the IP or a chip that contains the IP. However, existing fingerprinting techniques are not practical due to expensive cost of creating fingerprints and the lack of effective methods to verify the fingerprints. In the paper, we study a practical scan chain based fingerprinting method, where the digital fingerprint is generated by selecting the Q-SD or Q'-SD connection during the design of scan chains. This method has two major advantages. First, fingerprints are created as a post-silicon procedure and therefore there will be little fabrication overhead. Second, altering the Q-SD or Q'-SD connection style requires the modification of test vectors for each fingerprinted IP in order to maintain the fault coverage. This enables us to verify the fingerprint by inspecting the test vectors without opening up the chip to check the Q-SD or Q'-SD connection styles. We perform experiment on standard benchmarks to demonstrate that our approach has low design overhead. We also conduct security analysis to show that such fingerprints are robust against various attacks.