Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Shin, Kang G.  [Clear All Filters]
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
Tung, Yu-Chih, Shin, Kang G., Kim, Kyu-Han.  2016.  Analog Man-in-the-middle Attack Against Link-based Packet Source Identification. Proceedings of the 17th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing. :331–340.

A novel attack model is proposed against the existing wireless link-based source identification, which classifies packet sources according to the physical-layer link signatures. A link signature is believed to be a more reliable indicator than an IP or MAC address for identifying packet source, as it is generally harder to modify/forge. It is therefore expected to be a future authentication against impersonation and DoS attacks. However, if an attacker is equipped with the same capability/hardware as the authenticator to process physical-layer signals, a link signature can be easily manipulated by any nearby wireless device during the training phase. Based on this finding, we propose an attack model, called the analog man-in-the-middle (AMITM) attack, which utilizes the latest full-duplex relay technology to inject semi-controlled link signatures into authorized packets and reproduce the injected signature in the fabricated packets. Our experimental evaluation shows that with a proper parameter setting, 90% of fabricated packets are classified as those sent from an authorized transmitter. A countermeasure against this new attack is also proposed for the authenticator to inject link-signature noise by the same attack methodology.

Cho, Kyong-Tak, Shin, Kang G..  2016.  Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :1044–1055.

Contemporary vehicles are getting equipped with an increasing number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and wireless connectivities. Although these have enhanced vehicle safety and efficiency, they are accompanied with new vulnerabilities. In this paper, we unveil a new important vulnerability applicable to several in-vehicle networks including Control Area Network (CAN), the de facto standard in-vehicle network protocol. Specifically, we propose a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS), called the bus-off attack, which exploits the error-handling scheme of in-vehicle networks to disconnect or shut down good/uncompromised ECUs. This is an important attack that must be thwarted, since the attack, once an ECU is compromised, is easy to be mounted on safety-critical ECUs while its prevention is very difficult. In addition to the discovery of this new vulnerability, we analyze its feasibility using actual in-vehicle network traffic, and demonstrate the attack on a CAN bus prototype as well as on two real vehicles. Based on our analysis and experimental results, we also propose and evaluate a mechanism to detect and prevent the bus-off attack.

Feng, Huan, Shin, Kang G..  2016.  Understanding and Defending the Binder Attack Surface in Android. Proceedings of the 32Nd Annual Conference on Computer Security Applications. :398–409.
In Android, communications between apps and system services are supported by a transaction-based Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanism. Binder, as the cornerstone of this IPC mechanism, separates two communicating parties as client and server. As with any client-server model, the server should not make any assumption on the validity (sanity) of client-side transaction. To our surprise, we find this principle has frequently been overlooked in the implementation of Android system services. In this paper, we try to answer why developers keep making this seemingly simple mistake by studying more than 100 vulnerabilities on this attack surface. We analyzed these vulnerabilities to find that most of them are rooted at a common confusion of where the actual security boundary is among system developers. We thus highlight the deficiency of testing only on client-side public APIs and argue for the necessity of testing and protection on the Binder interface — the actual security boundary. Specifically, we design and implement BinderCracker, an automatic testing framework that supports context-aware fuzzing and actively manages the dependency between transactions. It does not require the source codes of the component under test, is compatible with services in different layers, and performs much more effectively than simple black-box fuzzing. We also call attention to the attack attribution problem for IPC-based attacks. The lack of OS-level support makes it very difficult to identify the culprit apps even for developers with adb access. We address this issue by providing an informative runtime diagnostic tool that tracks the origin, schema, content, and parsing details of each failed transaction. This brings transparency into the IPC process and provides an essential step for other in-depth analysis or forensics.