Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Potteiger, Bradley  [Clear All Filters]
2019-02-13
Neema, Himanshu, Potteiger, Bradley, Koutsoukos, Xenofon, Karsai, Gabor, Volgyesi, Peter, Sztipanovits, Janos.  2018.  Integrated Simulation Testbed for Security and Resilience of CPS. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. :368–374.
Owing1 to an immense growth of internet-connected and learning-enabled cyber-physical systems (CPSs) [1], several new types of attack vectors have emerged. Analyzing security and resilience of these complex CPSs is difficult as it requires evaluating many subsystems and factors in an integrated manner. Integrated simulation of physical systems and communication network can provide an underlying framework for creating a reusable and configurable testbed for such analyses. Using a model-based integration approach and the IEEE High-Level Architecture (HLA) [2] based distributed simulation software; we have created a testbed for integrated evaluation of large-scale CPS systems. Our tested supports web-based collaborative metamodeling and modeling of CPS system and experiments and a cloud computing environment for executing integrated networked co-simulations. A modular and extensible cyber-attack library enables validating the CPS under a variety of configurable cyber-attacks, such as DDoS and integrity attacks. Hardware-in-the-loop simulation is also supported along with several hardware attacks. Further, a scenario modeling language allows modeling of alternative paths (Courses of Actions) that enables validating CPS under different what-if scenarios as well as conducting cyber-gaming experiments. These capabilities make our testbed well suited for analyzing security and resilience of CPS. In addition, the web-based modeling and cloud-hosted execution infrastructure enables one to exercise the entire testbed using simply a web-browser, with integrated live experimental results display.
2018-12-10
Potteiger, Bradley, Zhang, Zhenkai, Koutsoukos, Xenofon.  2018.  Integrated Instruction Set Randomization and Control Reconfiguration for Securing Cyber-physical Systems. Proceedings of the 5th Annual Symposium and Bootcamp on Hot Topics in the Science of Security. :5:1–5:10.

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have been increasingly subject to cyber-attacks including code injection attacks. Zero day attacks further exasperate the threat landscape by requiring a shift to defense in depth approaches. With the tightly coupled nature of cyber components with the physical domain, these attacks have the potential to cause significant damage if safety-critical applications such as automobiles are compromised. Moving target defense techniques such as instruction set randomization (ISR) have been commonly proposed to address these types of attacks. However, under current implementations an attack can result in system crashing which is unacceptable in CPS. As such, CPS necessitate proper control reconfiguration mechanisms to prevent a loss of availability in system operation. This paper addresses the problem of maintaining system and security properties of a CPS under attack by integrating ISR, detection, and recovery capabilities that ensure safe, reliable, and predictable system operation. Specifically, we consider the problem of detecting code injection attacks and reconfiguring the controller in real-time. The developed framework is demonstrated with an autonomous vehicle case study.

2017-05-22
Potteiger, Bradley, Martins, Goncalo, Koutsoukos, Xenofon.  2016.  Software and Attack Centric Integrated Threat Modeling for Quantitative Risk Assessment. Proceedings of the Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security. :99–108.

One step involved in the security engineering process is threat modeling. Threat modeling involves understanding the complexity of the system and identifying all of the possible threats, regardless of whether or not they can be exploited. Proper identification of threats and appropriate selection of countermeasures reduces the ability of attackers to misuse the system. This paper presents a quantitative, integrated threat modeling approach that merges software and attack centric threat modeling techniques. The threat model is composed of a system model representing the physical and network infrastructure layout, as well as a component model illustrating component specific threats. Component attack trees allow for modeling specific component contained attack vectors, while system attack graphs illustrate multi-component, multi-step attack vectors across the system. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is leveraged to provide a standardized method of quantifying the low level vulnerabilities in the attack trees. As a case study, a railway communication network is used, and the respective results using a threat modeling software tool are presented.

2017-04-24
Neema, Himanshu, Volgyesi, Peter, Potteiger, Bradley, Emfinger, William, Koutsoukos, Xenofon, Karsai, Gabor, Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy, Sztipanovits, Janos.  2016.  SURE: An Experimentation and Evaluation Testbed for CPS Security and Resilience: Demo Abstract. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. :27:1–27:1.

In-depth consideration and evaluation of security and resilience is necessary for developing the scientific foundations and technology of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). In this demonstration, we present SURE [1], a CPS experimentation and evaluation testbed for security and resilience focusing on transportation networks. The testbed includes (1) a heterogeneous modeling and simulation integration platform, (2) a Web-based tool for modeling CPS in adversarial environments, and (3) a framework for evaluating resilience using attacker-defender games. Users such as CPS designers and operators can interact with the testbed to evaluate monitoring and control schemes that include sensor placement and traffic signal configuration.