Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Keyword is Intel SGX  [Clear All Filters]
2022-05-10
Zum Felde, Hendrik Meyer, Morbitzer, Mathias, Schütte, Julian.  2021.  Securing Remote Policy Enforcement by a Multi-Enclave based Attestation Architecture. 2021 IEEE 19th International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing (EUC). :102–108.
The concept of usage control goes beyond traditional access control by regulating not only the retrieval but also the processing of data. To be able to remotely enforce usage control policy the processing party requires a trusted execution environ-ment such as Intel SGX which creates so-called enclaves. In this paper we introduce Multi Enclave based Code from Template (MECT), an SGX-based architecture for trusted remote policy enforcement. MECT uses a multi-enclave approach in which an enclave generation service dynamically generates enclaves from pre-defined code and dynamic policy parameters. This approach leads to a small trusted computing base and highly simplified attestation while preserving functionality benefits. Our proof of concept implementation consumes customisable code from templates. We compare the implementation with other architectures regarding the trusted computing base, flexibility, performance, and modularity. This comparison highlights the security benefits for remote attestation of MECT.
2022-02-24
Liu, Weijie, Wang, Wenhao, Chen, Hongbo, Wang, XiaoFeng, Lu, Yaosong, Chen, Kai, Wang, Xinyu, Shen, Qintao, Chen, Yi, Tang, Haixu.  2021.  Practical and Efficient In-Enclave Verification of Privacy Compliance. 2021 51st Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). :413–425.
A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) runs attestation to prove to a data owner the integrity of the initial state of an enclave, including the program to operate on her data. For this purpose, the data-processing program is supposed to be open to the owner or a trusted third party, so its functionality can be evaluated before trust being established. In the real world, however, increasingly there are application scenarios in which the program itself needs to be protected (e.g., proprietary algorithm). So its compliance with privacy policies as expected by the data owner should be verified without exposing its code.To this end, this paper presents DEFLECTION, a new model for TEE-based delegated and flexible in-enclave code verification. Given that the conventional solutions do not work well under the resource-limited and TCB-frugal TEE, we come up with a new design inspired by Proof-Carrying Code. Our design strategically moves most of the workload to the code generator, which is responsible for producing easy-to-check code, while keeping the consumer simple. Also, the whole consumer can be made public and verified through a conventional attestation. We implemented this model on Intel SGX and demonstrate that it introduces a very small part of TCB. We also thoroughly evaluated its performance on micro-and macro-benchmarks and real-world applications, showing that the design only incurs a small overhead when enforcing several categories of security policies.
2022-01-25
Ozga, Wojciech, Le Quoc, Do, Fetzer, Christof.  2021.  TRIGLAV: Remote Attestation of the Virtual Machine's Runtime Integrity in Public Clouds. 2021 IEEE 14th International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD). :1–12.
Trust is of paramount concern for tenants to deploy their security-sensitive services in the cloud. The integrity of virtual machines (VMs) in which these services are deployed needs to be ensured even in the presence of powerful adversaries with administrative access to the cloud. Traditional approaches for solving this challenge leverage trusted computing techniques, e.g., vTPM, or hardware CPU extensions, e.g., AMD SEV. But, they are vulnerable to powerful adversaries, or they provide only load time (not runtime) integrity measurements of VMs. We propose TRIGLAV, a protocol allowing tenants to establish and maintain trust in VM runtime integrity of software and its configuration. TRIGLAV is transparent to the VM configuration and setup. It performs an implicit attestation of VMs during a secure login and binds the VM integrity state with the secure connection. Our prototype's evaluation shows that TRIGLAV is practical and incurs low performance overhead (\textbackslashtextless 6%).
2021-09-30
Khalid, Fatima, Masood, Ammar.  2020.  Hardware-Assisted Isolation Technologies: Security Architecture and Vulnerability Analysis. 2020 International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS). :1–8.
Hardware-assisted isolation technology provide a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of a system. Since there is no standardization for such systems, many technologies using different approaches have been implemented over time. Before selecting or implementing a TEE, it is essential to understand the security architecture, features and analyze the technologies with respect to the new security vulnerabilities (i.e. Micro-architectural class of vulnerabilities). These technologies can be divided into two main types: 1) Isolation by software virtualization and 2) Isolation by hardware. In this paper, we discuss technology implementation of each type i.e. Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone for type-1; Intel ME and AMD Secure Processor for type-2. We also cover the vulnerability analysis against each technology with respect to the latest discovered attacks. This would enable a user to precisely appreciate the security capabilities of each technology.
2021-05-13
Sardar, Muhammad Usama, Quoc, Do Le, Fetzer, Christof.  2020.  Towards Formalization of Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)-based Remote Attestation in Intel SGX. 2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD). :604—607.

Vulnerabilities in privileged software layers have been exploited with severe consequences. Recently, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) based technologies have emerged as a promising approach since they claim strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees regardless of the trustworthiness of the underlying system software. In this paper, we consider one of the most prominent TEE technologies, referred to as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). Despite many formal approaches, there is still a lack of formal proof of some critical processes of Intel SGX, such as remote attestation. To fill this gap, we propose a fully automated, rigorous, and sound formal approach to specify and verify the Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)-based remote attestation in Intel SGX under the assumption that there are no side-channel attacks and no vulnerabilities inside the enclave. The evaluation indicates that the confidentiality of attestation keys is preserved against a Dolev-Yao adversary in this technology. We also present a few of the many inconsistencies found in the existing literature on Intel SGX attestation during formal specification.

2021-04-27
Ferreira, B., Portela, B., Oliveira, T., Borges, G., Domingos, H. J., Leitao, J..  2020.  Boolean Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Filters on Trusted Hardware. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing. :1–1.
The prevalence and availability of cloud infrastructures has made them the de facto solution for storing and archiving data, both for organizations and individual users. Nonetheless, the cloud's wide spread adoption is still hindered by dependability and security concerns, particularly in applications with large data collections where efficient search and retrieval services are also major requirements. This leads to an increased tension between security, efficiency, and search expressiveness. In this paper we tackle this tension by proposing BISEN, a new provably-secure boolean searchable symmetric encryption scheme that improves these three complementary dimensions by exploring the design space of isolation guarantees offered by novel commodity hardware such as Intel SGX, abstracted as Isolated Execution Environments (IEEs). BISEN is the first scheme to support multiple users and enable highly expressive and arbitrarily complex boolean queries, with minimal information leakage regarding performed queries and accessed data, and verifiability regarding fully malicious adversaries. Furthermore, BISEN extends the traditional SSE model to support filter functions on search results based on generic metadata created by the users. Experimental validation and comparison with the state of art shows that BISEN provides better performance with enriched search semantics and security properties.
Fuhry, B., Hirschoff, L., Koesnadi, S., Kerschbaum, F..  2020.  SeGShare: Secure Group File Sharing in the Cloud using Enclaves. 2020 50th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). :476—488.
File sharing applications using cloud storage are increasingly popular for personal and business use. Due to data protection concerns, end-to-end encryption is often a desired feature of these applications. Many attempts at designing cryptographic solutions fail to be adopted due to missing relevant features. We present SeGShare, a new architecture for end-to-end encrypted, group-based file sharing using trusted execution environments (TEE), e.g., Intel SGX. SeGShare is the first solution to protect the confidentiality and integrity of all data and management files; enforce immediate permission and membership revocations; support deduplication; and mitigate rollback attacks. Next to authentication, authorization and file system management, our implementation features an optimized TLS layer that enables high throughput and low latency. The encryption overhead of our implementation is extremely small in computation and storage resources. Our enclave code comprises less than 8500 lines of code enabling efficient mitigation of common pitfalls in deploying code to TEEs.
2021-04-08
Yang, Z., Li, X., Wei, L., Zhang, C., Gu, C..  2020.  SGX-ICN: A Secure and Privacy-Preserving Information-Centric Networking with SGX Enclaves. 2020 3rd International Conference on Hot Information-Centric Networking (HotICN). :142–147.
As the next-generation network architecture, Information-Centric Networking (ICN) has emerged as a novel paradigm to cope with the increasing demand for content delivery on the Internet. In contrast to the conventional host-centric architectures, ICN focuses on content retrieval based on their name rather than their storage location. However, ICN is vulnerable to various security and privacy attacks due to the inherent attributes of the ICN architectures. For example, a curious ICN node can monitor the network traffic to reveal the sensitive data issued by specific users. Hence, further research on privacy protection for ICN is needed. This paper presents a practical approach to effectively enhancing the security and privacy of ICN by utilizing Intel SGX, a commodity trusted execution environment. The main idea is to leverage secure enclaves residing on ICN nodes to do computations on sensitive data. Performance evaluations on the real-world datasets demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed scheme. Moreover, our scheme outperforms the cryptography based method.
2020-12-21
Liu, Q., Wu, W., Liu, Q., Huangy, Q..  2020.  T2DNS: A Third-Party DNS Service with Privacy Preservation and Trustworthiness. 2020 29th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN). :1–11.
We design a third-party DNS service named T2DNS. T2DNS serves client DNS queries with the following features: protecting clients from channel and server attackers, providing trustworthiness proof to clients, being compatible with the existing Internet infrastructure, and introducing bounded overhead. T2DNS's privacy preservation is achieved by a hybrid protocol of encryption and obfuscation, and its service proxy is implemented on Intel SGX. We overcome the challenges of scaling the initialization process, bounding the obfuscation overhead, and tuning practical system parameters. We prototype T2DNS, and experiment results show that T2DNS is fully functional, has acceptable overhead in comparison with other solutions, and is scalable to the number of clients.
2019-11-19
Kurnikov, Arseny, Paverd, Andrew, Mannan, Mohammad, Asokan, N..  2018.  Keys in the Clouds: Auditable Multi-Device Access to Cryptographic Credentials. Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security. :40:1-40:10.

Personal cryptographic keys are the foundation of many secure services, but storing these keys securely is a challenge, especially if they are used from multiple devices. Storing keys in a centralized location, like an Internet-accessible server, raises serious security concerns (e.g. server compromise). Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a well-known solution for protecting sensitive data in untrusted environments, and are now becoming available on commodity server platforms. Although the idea of protecting keys using a server-side TEE is straight-forward, in this paper we validate this approach and show that it enables new desirable functionality. We describe the design, implementation, and evaluation of a TEE-based Cloud Key Store (CKS), an online service for securely generating, storing, and using personal cryptographic keys. Using remote attestation, users receive strong assurance about the behaviour of the CKS, and can authenticate themselves using passwords while avoiding typical risks of password-based authentication like password theft or phishing. In addition, this design allows users to i) define policy-based access controls for keys; ii) delegate keys to other CKS users for a specified time and/or a limited number of uses; and iii) audit all key usages via a secure audit log. We have implemented a proof of concept CKS using Intel SGX and integrated this into GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain on Android. Our CKS implementation performs approximately 6,000 signature operations per second on a single desktop PC. The latency is in the same order of magnitude as using locally-stored keys, and 20x faster than smart cards.

2019-10-02
Andre, Greubel, Alexandra, Dmitrienko, Samuel, Kounev.  2018.  SmarTor: Smarter Tor with Smart Contracts: Improving Resilience of Topology Distribution in the Tor Network. Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. :677–691.
In the Tor anonymity network, the distribution of topology information relies on the correct behavior of five out of the nine trusted directory authority servers. This centralization is concerning since a powerful adversary might compromise these servers and conceal information about honest nodes, leading to the full de-anonymization of all Tor users. Our work aims at distributing the work of these trusted authorities, such increasing resilience against attacks on core infrastructure components of the Tor network. In particular, we leverage several emerging technologies, such as blockchains, smart contracts, and trusted execution environments to design and prototype a system called SmarTor. This system replaces the directory authorities with a smart contract and a distributed network of untrusted entities responsible for bandwidth measurements. We prototyped SmarTor using Ethereum smart contracts and Intel SGX secure hardware. In our evaluation, we show that SmarTor produces significantly more reliable and precise measurements compared to the current measurement system. Overall, our solution improves the decentralization of the Tor network, reduces trust assumptions and increases resilience against powerful adversaries like law enforcement and intelligence services.
2019-06-17
Krahn, Robert, Trach, Bohdan, Vahldiek-Oberwagner, Anjo, Knauth, Thomas, Bhatotia, Pramod, Fetzer, Christof.  2018.  Pesos: Policy Enhanced Secure Object Store. Proceedings of the Thirteenth EuroSys Conference. :25:1–25:17.
Third-party storage services pose the risk of integrity and confidentiality violations as the current storage policy enforcement mechanisms are spread across many layers in the system stack. To mitigate these security vulnerabilities, we present the design and implementation of Pesos, a Policy Enhanced Secure Object Store (Pesos) for untrusted third-party storage providers. Pesos allows clients to specify per-object security policies, concisely and separately from the storage stack, and enforces these policies by securely mediating the I/O in the persistence layer through a single unified enforcement layer. More broadly, Pesos exposes a rich set of storage policies ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and access accounting for data storage through a declarative policy language. Pesos enforces these policies on untrusted commodity platforms by leveraging a combination of two trusted computing technologies: Intel SGX for trusted execution environment (TEE) and Kinetic Open Storage for trusted storage. We have implemented Pesos as a fully-functional storage system supporting many useful end-to-end storage features, and a range of effective performance optimizations. We evaluated Pesos using a range of micro-benchmarks, and real-world use cases. Our evaluation shows that Pesos incurs reasonable performance overheads for the enforcement of policies while keeping the trusted computing base (TCB) small.
2019-03-18
Tran, Muoi, Luu, Loi, Kang, Min Suk, Bentov, Iddo, Saxena, Prateek.  2018.  Obscuro: A Bitcoin Mixer Using Trusted Execution Environments. Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. :692–701.
Bitcoin provides only pseudo-anonymous transactions, which can be exploited to link payers and payees – defeating the goal of anonymous payments. To thwart such attacks, several Bitcoin mixers have been proposed, with the objective of providing unlinkability between payers and payees. However, existing Bitcoin mixers can be regarded as either insecure or inefficient. We present Obscuro, a highly efficient and secure Bitcoin mixer that utilizes trusted execution environments (TEEs). With the TEE's confidentiality and integrity guarantees for code and data, our mixer design ensures the correct mixing operations and the protection of sensitive data (i.e., private keys and mixing logs), ruling out coin theft and address linking attacks by a malicious service provider. Yet, the TEE-based implementation does not prevent the manipulation of inputs (e.g., deposit submissions, blockchain feeds) to the mixer, hence Obscuro is designed to overcome such limitations: it (1) offers an indirect deposit mechanism to prevent a malicious service provider from rejecting benign user deposits; and (2) scrutinizes blockchain feeds to prevent deposits from being mixed more than once (thus degrading anonymity) while being eclipsed from the main blockchain branch. In addition, Obscuro provides several unique anonymity features (e.g., minimum mixing set size guarantee, resistant to dropping user deposits) that are not available in existing centralized and decentralized mixers. Our prototype of Obscuro is built using Intel SGX and we demonstrate its effectiveness in Bitcoin Testnet. Our implementation mixes 1000 inputs in just 6.49 seconds, which vastly outperforms all of the existing decentralized mixers.
Condé, R. C. R., Maziero, C. A., Will, N. C..  2018.  Using Intel SGX to Protect Authentication Credentials in an Untrusted Operating System. 2018 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC). :00158–00163.
An important principle in computational security is to reduce the attack surface, by maintaining the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) small. Even so, no security technique ensures full protection against any adversary. Thus, sensitive applications should be designed with several layers of protection so that, even if a layer might be violated, sensitive content will not be compromised. In 2015, Intel released the Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology in its processors. This mechanism allows applications to allocate enclaves, which are private memory regions that can hold code and data. Other applications and even privileged code, like the OS kernel and the BIOS, are not able to access enclaves' contents. This paper presents a novel password file protection scheme, which uses Intel SGX to protect authentication credentials in the PAM authentication framework, commonly used in UNIX systems. We defined and implemented an SGX-enabled version of the pam\_unix.so authentication module, called UniSGX. This module uses an SGX enclave to handle the credentials informed by the user and to check them against the password file. To add an extra security layer, the password file is stored using SGX sealing. A threat model was proposed to assess the security of the proposed solution. The obtained results show that the proposed solution is secure against the threat model considered, and that its performance overhead is acceptable from the user point of view. The scheme presented here is also suitable to other authentication frameworks.
2019-03-11
Hunt, Tyler, Zhu, Zhiting, Xu, Yuanzhong, Peter, Simon, Witchel, Emmett.  2018.  Ryoan: A Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst.. 35:13:1–13:32.
Users of modern data-processing services such as tax preparation or genomic screening are forced to trust them with data that the users wish to keep secret. Ryoan1 protects secret data while it is processed by services that the data owner does not trust. Accomplishing this goal in a distributed setting is difficult, because the user has no control over the service providers or the computational platform. Confining code to prevent it from leaking secrets is notoriously difficult, but Ryoan benefits from new hardware and a request-oriented data model. Ryoan provides a distributed sandbox, leveraging hardware enclaves (e.g., Intel’s software guard extensions (SGX) [40]) to protect sandbox instances from potentially malicious computing platforms. The protected sandbox instances confine untrusted data-processing modules to prevent leakage of the user’s input data. Ryoan is designed for a request-oriented data model, where confined modules only process input once and do not persist state about the input. We present the design and prototype implementation of Ryoan and evaluate it on a series of challenging problems including email filtering, health analysis, image processing and machine translation.
2018-09-12
Han, Juhyeng, Kim, Seongmin, Ha, Jaehyeong, Han, Dongsu.  2017.  SGX-Box: Enabling Visibility on Encrypted Traffic Using a Secure Middlebox Module. Proceedings of the First Asia-Pacific Workshop on Networking. :99–105.

A network middlebox benefits both users and network operators by offering a wide range of security-related in-network functions, such as web firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS). However, the wide usage of encryption protocol restricts functionalities of network middleboxes. This forces network operators and users to make a choice between end-to-end privacy and security. This paper presents SGX-Box, a secure middlebox system that enables visibility on encrypted traffic by leveraging Intel SGX technology. The entire process of SGX-Box ensures that the sensitive information, such as decrypted payloads and session keys, is securely protected within the SGX enclave. SGX-Box provides easy-to-use abstraction and a high-level programming language, called SB lang for handling encrypted traffic in middleboxes. It greatly enhances programmability by hiding details of the cryptographic operations and the implementation details in SGX enclave processing. We implement a proof-of-concept IDS using SB lang. Our preliminary evaluation shows that SGX-Box incurs acceptable performance overhead while it dramatically reduces middlebox developer's effort.

2018-09-05
Chaiphet, Chiraphat, Ngamsuriyaroj, Sudsanguan, Awad, Ahmed, Jacob, Betran, Gakos, Ioannis, Grajkowski, Wiktor.  2017.  Secure Enclave for TLS Web Server on Untrusted Environment. Proceedings of the 2017 the 7th International Conference on Communication and Network Security. :27–31.
Web servers use SSL/TLS to establish secure communication between clients and servers. The mechanism of SSL/TLS relies on a key pair to validate the server and to protect the confidentiality of the data. However, many websites are running on third-party servers or on cloud environments where website owners have no control over the physical servers or the software including the operating systems but still need to trust and store the private key on the servers. While it is common to store the encrypted key on the disk, the web server still need a decrypted key inside the memory during the operation. Thus, an adversary could obtain the private key residing on the web server's memory. In this paper, we propose a secure enclave for a web server running the high privilege code that handles the secret keys inside an encrypted memory area by utilizing Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) whereas other components of the web server outside the trusted computing base are left intact. The experimental results show 19% to 38% implementation overhead depending on which cipher suite is used and how a session key is handled.
2018-06-11
Gremaud, Pascal, Durand, Arnaud, Pasquier, Jacques.  2017.  A Secure, Privacy-preserving IoT Middleware Using Intel SGX. Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on the Internet of Things. :22:1–22:2.
With Internet of Things (IoT) middleware solutions moving towards cloud computing, the problems of trust in cloud platforms and data privacy need to be solved. The emergence of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) opens new perspectives to increase security in cloud applications. We propose a privacy-preserving IoT middleware, using Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to create a secure system on untrusted platforms. An encrypted index is used as a database and communication with the application is protected using asymmetric encryption. This set of measures allows our system to process events in an orchestration engine without revealing data to the hosting cloud platform.
2018-04-11
Wang, Wenhao, Chen, Guoxing, Pan, Xiaorui, Zhang, Yinqian, Wang, XiaoFeng, Bindschaedler, Vincent, Tang, Haixu, Gunter, Carl A..  2017.  Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :2421–2434.

Side-channel risks of Intel SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the page-level access patterns of a protected process running in an SGX enclave. With almost all proposed defense focusing on this attack, little is known about whether such efforts indeed raise the bar for the adversary, whether a simple variation of the attack renders all protection ineffective, not to mention an in-depth understanding of other attack surfaces in the SGX system. In the paper, we report the first step toward systematic analyses of side-channel threats that SGX faces, focusing on the risks associated with its memory management. Our research identifies 8 potential attack vectors, ranging from TLB to DRAM modules. More importantly, we highlight the common misunderstandings about SGX memory side channels, demonstrating that high frequent AEXs can be avoided when recovering EdDSA secret key through a new page channel and fine-grained monitoring of enclave programs (at the level of 64B) can be done through combining both cache and cross-enclave DRAM channels. Our findings reveal the gap between the ongoing security research on SGX and its side-channel weaknesses, redefine the side-channel threat model for secure enclaves, and can provoke a discussion on when to use such a system and how to use it securely.

2018-03-26
Goltzsche, David, Wulf, Colin, Muthukumaran, Divya, Rieck, Konrad, Pietzuch, Peter, Kapitza, Rüdiger.  2017.  TrustJS: Trusted Client-Side Execution of JavaScript. Proceedings of the 10th European Workshop on Systems Security. :7:1–7:6.

Client-side JavaScript has become ubiquitous in web applications to improve user experience and reduce server load. However, since clients are untrusted, servers cannot rely on the confidentiality or integrity of client-side JavaScript code and the data that it operates on. For example, client-side input validation must be repeated at server side, and confidential business logic cannot be offloaded. In this paper, we present TrustJS, a framework that enables trustworthy execution of security-sensitive JavaScript inside commodity browsers. TrustJS leverages trusted hardware support provided by Intel SGX to protect the client-side execution of JavaScript, enabling a flexible partitioning of web application code. We present the design of TrustJS and provide initial evaluation results, showing that trustworthy JavaScript offloading can further improve user experience and conserve more server resources.

2018-01-16
Vavala, B., Neves, N., Steenkiste, P..  2017.  Secure Tera-scale Data Crunching with a Small TCB. 2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). :169–180.

Outsourcing services to third-party providers comes with a high security cost-to fully trust the providers. Using trusted hardware can help, but current trusted execution environments do not adequately support services that process very large scale datasets. We present LASTGT, a system that bridges this gap by supporting the execution of self-contained services over a large state, with a small and generic trusted computing base (TCB). LASTGT uses widely deployed trusted hardware to guarantee integrity and verifiability of the execution on a remote platform, and it securely supplies data to the service through simple techniques based on virtual memory. As a result, LASTGT is general and applicable to many scenarios such as computational genomics and databases, as we show in our experimental evaluation based on an implementation of LAST-GT on a secure hypervisor. We also describe a possible implementation on Intel SGX.

2017-11-13
Shepherd, C., Arfaoui, G., Gurulian, I., Lee, R. P., Markantonakis, K., Akram, R. N., Sauveron, D., Conchon, E..  2016.  Secure and Trusted Execution: Past, Present, and Future - A Critical Review in the Context of the Internet of Things and Cyber-Physical Systems. 2016 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA. :168–177.

Notions like security, trust, and privacy are crucial in the digital environment and in the future, with the advent of technologies like the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), their importance is only going to increase. Trust has different definitions, some situations rely on real-world relationships between entities while others depend on robust technologies to gain trust after deployment. In this paper we focus on these robust technologies, their evolution in past decades and their scope in the near future. The evolution of robust trust technologies has involved diverse approaches, as a consequence trust is defined, understood and ascertained differently across heterogeneous domains and technologies. In this paper we look at digital trust technologies from the point of view of security and examine how they are making secure computing an attainable reality. The paper also revisits and analyses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Secure Elements (SE), Hypervisors and Virtualisation, Intel TXT, Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) like GlobalPlatform TEE, Intel SGX, along with Host Card Emulation, and Encrypted Execution Environment (E3). In our analysis we focus on these technologies and their application to the emerging domains of the IoT and CPS.

2017-10-03
Zhang, Fan, Cecchetti, Ethan, Croman, Kyle, Juels, Ari, Shi, Elaine.  2016.  Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :270–282.

Smart contracts are programs that execute autonomously on blockchains. Their key envisioned uses (e.g. financial instruments) require them to consume data from outside the blockchain (e.g. stock quotes). Trustworthy data feeds that support a broad range of data requests will thus be critical to smart contract ecosystems. We present an authenticated data feed system called Town Crier (TC). TC acts as a bridge between smart contracts and existing web sites, which are already commonly trusted for non-blockchain applications. It combines a blockchain front end with a trusted hardware back end to scrape HTTPS-enabled websites and serve source-authenticated data to relying smart contracts. TC also supports confidentiality. It enables private data requests with encrypted parameters. Additionally, in a generalization that executes smart-contract logic within TC, the system permits secure use of user credentials to scrape access-controlled online data sources. We describe TC's design principles and architecture and report on an implementation that uses Intel's recently introduced Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to furnish data to the Ethereum smart contract system. We formally model TC and define and prove its basic security properties in the Universal Composibility (UC) framework. Our results include definitions and techniques of general interest relating to resource consumption (Ethereum's "gas" fee system) and TCB minimization. We also report on experiments with three example applications. We plan to launch TC soon as an online public service.

2017-09-19
Shinde, Shweta, Chua, Zheng Leong, Narayanan, Viswesh, Saxena, Prateek.  2016.  Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets. Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :317–328.

New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this paper, we show that the page fault side-channel has sufficient channel capacity to extract bits of encryption keys from commodity implementations of cryptographic routines in OpenSSL and Libgcrypt – leaking 27% on average and up to 100% of the secret bits in many case-studies. To mitigate this, we propose a software-only defense that masks page fault patterns by determinising the program's memory access behavior. We show that such a technique can be built into a compiler, and implement it for a subset of C which is sufficient to handle the cryptographic routines we study. This defense when implemented generically can have significant overhead of up to 4000X, but with help of developer-assisted compiler optimizations, the overhead reduces to at most 29.22% in our case studies. Finally, we discuss scope for hardware-assisted defenses, and show one solution that can reduce overheads to 6.77% with support from hardware changes.

2017-08-02
Krawiecka, Klaudia, Paverd, Andrew, Asokan, N..  2016.  Protecting Password Databases Using Trusted Hardware. Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution. :9:1–9:6.