HCSS 2016

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Visible to the public Moving Hardware from “Security through Obscurity” to “Secure by Design”

ABSTRACT
It is a difficult, perhaps impossible, task to design modern hardware that is impervious to any and every attack. It is hard to insure that these complex, multi-billion transistor systems are functionally correct, let alone secure. Yet, for the most part, computing system designers assume that the hardware is secure and focus their security efforts at higher levels of abstraction (OS, programming language, algorithm, etc.). Recent attacks have shown this is a false premise, and building upon an insecure foundation is a recipe for disaster.

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Visible to the public Gradual Information Flow Control

ABSTRACT
Information-flow control (IFC) is a cornerstone of language-based security. A typical IFC policy rules out the flow of information from classified sources to public sinks. The technical property aimed for is noninterference: changes in a classified source do not influence the public sinks. Noninterference comes in different flavors depending on the observational capabilities of an attacker.

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Visible to the public Combinatorial Coverage Analysis of Subsets of the TLS Cipher Suite Registry

ABSTRACT
We present a combinatorial coverage measurement for (subsets) of the TLS cipher suite registries by analyzing the specific ciphers of IANA, ENISA, BSI, Mozilla and NSA Suite B. Our findings contribute towards the design of quality measures of recommended ciphers for TLS and also lead to important questions regarding the future development of TLS.