The goal of this research is to develop fundamental theory, efficient algorithms, and realistic experiments for the analysis and design of safety-critical cyber-physical transportation systems with human operators. The research focuses on preventing crashes between automobiles at road intersections, since these account for about 40% of overall vehicle crashes. Specifically, the main objective of this work is to design provably safe driver-assist systems that understand driver?s intentions and provide warnings/overrides to prevent collisions. In order to pursue this goal, hybrid automata models for the driver-vehicles-intersection system, incorporating driver behavior and performance as an integral part, are derived from human-factors experiments. A partial order of these hybrid automata models is constructed, according to confidence levels on the model parameters. The driver-assist design problem is then formulated as a set of partially ordered hybrid differential games with imperfect information, in which games are ordered according to parameter confidence levels. The resulting designs are validated experimentally in a driving simulator and in large-scale computer simulations. This research leverages the potential of embedded control and communication technologies to prevent crashes at traffic intersections, by enabling networks of smart vehicles to cooperate with each other, with the surrounding infrastructure, and with their drivers to make transportation safer, more enjoyable, and more efficient. The work is based on a collaboration among researchers in formal methods, autonomous control, and human factors who are studying realistic and provably correct warning/override algorithms that can be readily transitioned to production vehicles.

Trustworthy operation of next-generation complex power grid critical infrastructures requires mathematical and practical verification solutions to guarantee the correct infrastructural functionalities. This project develops the foundations of theoretical modeling, synthesis and real-world deployment of a formal and scalable controller code verifier for programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in cyber-physical settings. PLCs are widely used for control automation in industrial control systems. A PLC is typically connected to an engineering workstation where engineers develop the control logic to process the input values from sensors and issue control commands to actuators. The project focuses on protecting infrastructures against malicious control injection attacks on PLCs, such as Stuxnet, that inject malicious code on the device to drive the underlying physical platform to an unsafe state. The broader impact of this proposal is highly significant. It offers potential for real-time security for critical infrastructure systems covering sectors such as energy and manufacturing. The project's intellectual merit is in providing a mathematical and practical verification framework for cyber-physical systems through integration of offline formal methods, online monitoring solutions, and power systems analysis. Offline formal methods do not scale for large-scale platforms due to their exhaustive safety analysis of all possible system states, while online monitoring often reports findings too late for preventative action. This project takes a hybrid approach that dynamically predicts the possible next security incidents and reports to operators before an unsafe state is encountered, allowing time for response. The broader impact of this project is in providing practical mathematical analysis capabilities for general cyber-physical safety-critical infrastructure with potential direct impact on our national security. The research outcomes are integrated into education modules for graduate, undergraduate, and K-12 classrooms.